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ABSTRACT
When making a decision, people often receive advice before settling on a
particular course of action. Decision makers exhibit a spectrum of responses to advice,
ranging from total rejection to complete acceptance. The purpose of this study is to
examine predictors of advice use within a Judge-Advisor System (JAS: Sniezek &
Buckley, 1995). Prior research has examined a variety of task characteristics, advisor
characteristics, and decision maker characteristics (e.g. Bonaccio, 2007; Gino & Moore,
2007; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). In this study, judge characteristics including
confidence, accuracy, prior task knowledge, and other individual differences are
examined. Advisor characteristics such as advice cost and advisor expertise are
manipulated between persons. Results indicated that judge accuracy, confidence, and
prior task knowledge were all negatively related to advice utilization. Advice was
weighted more heavily when the judge was told that the advice came from an expert than
from a novice, but advice cost did not influence advice use. Implications and future
research directions are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Real decision problems rarely contain all the information that is necessary to
solve them. People therefore engage in social sense-making processes in order to
understand situational cues (Yates, Price, Lee, & Ramirez, 1996; Zarnoth & Sniezek,
1997). Decision makers (“Judges”) often solicit the opinion of others (“Advisors”)
before making a final commitment. A politician may receive advice from environmental
scientists before voting on legislation about sustainable resources, a high school student
queries peers and parents prior to choosing a college, and a lost motorist may request
advice from a pedestrian about the best way to reach a given destination.
Although advice is an important part of decision making, advice research is a
relatively new field (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). Most decision research has neglected the
social context of decisions (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). The research on „small
groups‟ decision making has primarily focused on persons with undifferentiated roles,
even though many groups have a primary decision maker (Kerr & Tinsdale, 2004). There
are relatively few empirical or theoretical studies linking advice to decision making (e.g.
Dalal, 2001; Patt, Bowles & Cash, 2006; Schrah, 2000; Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004;
Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000).
When a judge seeks advice from a qualified advisor or advisors, he or she
assesses the quality of the advice and integrates the advice with his own evaluation to
make a final decision (Yaniv, 2004). Receiving advice generally improves decision
accuracy (Patt, et al., 2006; Sniezek, et al., 2004; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger,
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2000). Seeking advice can help the judge fill in missing information, consider alternative
options, or confirm an existing opinion. Advice use improves decision quality when
advisors are „experts‟ that have received task specific training above and beyond the
judges (Harvey & Fischer, 1995; Schrah, 2000). Moreover, receiving advice improves the
accuracy of decisions even when the advisor and judge are equally qualified on the
subject (Gino, 2008; Gino & Moore, 2007; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). When a judge
averages more than one independent estimate into a final decision, it tends to reduce
error, even if the advisor is no more accurate than the judge (Larrick & Soll, 2006).
Even though advisors help people make better decisions, judges are not always
very good at knowing when and how much to use the advice. This paper will explore
several factors which influence the extent to which people use advice. After giving a
general overview of Judge-Advisor System (JAS) scenarios, I will define egocentric bias
and explain how it can paint an inordinately rosy picture of the judge‟s own knowledge
and accuracy (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Furthermore, I will discuss individual
differences that may influence a judge‟s receptiveness to advice, including decisionspecific knowledge, agreeableness, and confidence (Bonaccio, 2007; Bonaccio & Schrah,
2006), as well as the relationship between judge confidence and accuracy (Yaniv,
Choshen-Hillel, & Milyavsky, 2009).
After exploring judge characteristics, the paper will address characteristics of the
advice and advisor. Judges adjust their advice use accordingly to their perceptions of the
advisor and the perceived quality of the advice (Harvey & Fischer, 1995; Yaniv &
Kleinberger, 2000). Finally, prior research has found that advice cost strongly influences
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advice use (e.g. Gino, 2008). However, the mechanisms behind this paid advice effect are
incompletely understood. As sunk costs theory is the prevailing explanation of the paid
advice effect, it will be addressed in some detail, along with several competing and
complementary theories (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Gino, 2007; Monroe, 1973).
Judge-Advisor Systems
Advice studies often use a Judge-Advisor System (JAS) paradigm to create
pertinent decision-making scenarios. The participant (or judge) is responsible for giving
the best possible answer to a decision problem. After making an initial judgment, the
judge receives advice from one or more advisors. The judge is then responsible for
integrating the judgments of the advisors with his own initial judgment, and then making
a final decision. This paradigm accurately mimics many real-world advice scenarios.
Furthermore, because it collects judgment information both before and after receiving
advice, it is possible to assess the extent to which a judge modifies his or her final
decision after receiving advice.
There are two primary JAS paradigms. In „choice‟ scenarios, judges are presented
with multiple options and asked to select the best one. Researchers have generally used
product decisions for choice scenarios, such as identifying the most valuable mountain
bike (Schrah, 2000) or hiking backpack (Schrah, Dalal, & Sniezek, 2006). These
qualitative scenarios mimic decision making tasks such as choosing between medical
treatment options or purchasing a product. Advice in these scenarios generally consists of
a recommendation for a specific option. „Judgment‟ scenarios, by contrast, consist of one
or more quantitative estimations. Advice taking studies have used quantitative estimates
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of such divergent topics as historical dates (e.g. Gino, 2008; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000),
sales forecasts (Harvey, Harries, & Fischer, 2000), a person‟s body weight based on a
photograph (Gino & Moore, 2007), and livestock mortality rates for different epidemics
(Harvey & Fischer, 1997). After a judge has made an initial estimation, the advisor‟s
estimate is made available and the judge is asked to make a final decision. One advantage
that judgment scenarios offer is the ability of judges to accept advice in degree rather
than kind. Judges can be influenced by advice without fully accepting or fully rejecting it.
The weight of advice (WOA) can then be calculated to evaluate advice utilization. WOA
for a final estimate ranges from zero (when the final estimate is exactly the same as the
initial estimate) to one (when the final estimate is exactly the same as the advisor‟s
estimate). This study will use a quantitative judgment scenario in order to evaluate how
judges revise their opinions based on the advisor‟s recommendation.
Egocentric Bias
Judges vary their weighting policies based on their perceptions of themselves and
their perceptions of the advice1. Judges will lend more weight to an advisor‟s
recommendation if they are not confident in their own answers (Gino, 2008). Also, a
judge forms an opinion about the quality of the advice based on the perceived motivation
and expertise of the advisor, and varies his weighting policy accordingly (Bonaccio &
Dalal, 2009). This opinion can change across multiple interactions as a trust relationship
is developed (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000).

1

In the current context, a weighting policy is defined as the extent to which a judge uses an advisor‟s
estimate as compared to her own estimate when making a final decision.
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Individuals rarely use an optimal weighting strategy. Instead, all other things
being equal, they give disproportional weight to their own opinions as compared to
outside opinions. This non-optimal weighting error is known as advice discounting.
Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000) examined advice discounting in several judge-advisor
studies (JAS), using estimates of the dates of various historical events as the dependent
variable. They found that while judges are indeed more accurate when they have access
to advice, they do not use an optimal weighting strategy, discounting the advice of others
relative to their own opinions. Even though the initial estimates for judges and advisors
had similar accuracy ratings, the mean observed weight of own advice (WOA) was .29,
indicating non-optimal discounting.2
There are several reasons why an individual may underweight outside advice. If a
judge perceives that he is better informed or a more qualified decision maker than the
advisor, he will therefore give additional weight to his own judgments (Kreuger, 2003). If
a judge perceives himself as less qualified than the advisor, he will give less weight to his
own judgments. If everyone had an accurate perception of their own abilities, and were
randomly given access to the estimate of another person, it should result in an average
WOA of 0.5 (Larrick & Soll, 2006). However, people generally consider their own
opinions and judgments to be more accurate than the „average‟ person. This egocentric
bias leads to people generally overestimating the accuracy of their own opinions, and
skews weighting policies in a non-optimal manner (Kreuger, 2003).
2

While most research studies use Weight Of Advice (WOA) to describe advice utilization, some studies
use Weight of Own Estimate (WOE). WOE, while also ranging from 0 to 1, is the opposite of weight of
advice (e.g. WOE for this study was .71). All future WOE will all be converted to WOA.
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Economic theory supports the egocentric bias explanation of advice discounting
(e.g. Nishimura, 1991). Whenever a firm or individual has more information about their
own capital then one does about a different party, there is an imbalance in knowledge
known as differential information. Whereas a corporation may have intimate knowledge
about its own investments, technology, and strategy, they will rarely have such insight
into the designs of other corporations. Compounding this problem, people generally do
not „assume the best‟ when it comes to missing information. For example, judges tended
to interpret missing information about an advisor‟s intentions or expertise negatively
(Bonaccio, 2007). When applied to judge-advisor scenarios, this information imbalance
may encourage judges underweight advice. If they do not have access to the „private
knowledge‟ of the advisor, they will place more trust in their own opinions (Yaniv &
Kleinberger, 2000).
Decision makers are privy to their own reasons for holding an opinion or making
a choice, but do not have the same access to an advisor‟s internal reasoning process
(Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Since judges have less information about the logic or
motivation of the advisor as compared to the self, they discount the advice accordingly.
This problem may be attenuated in JAS studies, which generally convey the advisor‟s
opinion in a sparse fashion (e.g. a text box on a computer screen stating “The advisor‟s
estimate is X”). It is possible that the differential information problem is accentuated by
using a relatively information-poor way of receiving advice in such decision-making
studies. In the real world, advisors are more likely to explain their rationale for making a
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particular recommendation or holding an opinion. It is possible that this egocentric bias is
not as substantial outside of the laboratory.
Anchoring theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986) may also shed some light on
advice discounting. In most advice studies, judges give an initial estimate before
receiving input from an advisor. This initial estimate then serves as an anchor from which
the judge then adjusts his final estimate. By asking judges to make a formal estimate prior
to receiving advice, it is possible that it solidifies the judges‟ commitment to their initial
estimate. On average, judges are unwilling to adjust their scores too far away from their
anchor, which thus leads to advice discounting when the advisor‟s estimate is far away
from the judge‟s initial estimate (Harvey & Fischer, 1997).
Individual differences in egocentric discounting
However, people do not always favor their own opinions when faced with a
decision task. For example, egocentric discounting is reduced when there are financial
incentives to do well, or when making a decision that could have negative consequences
(Bonaccio & Dalal, 2009; Dalal, 2001; Sniezek et al, 2004). By using advice, judges
avoid shouldering the full responsibility for the final decision. Participants vary their
weighting strategies according to the difficulty of the task, even when advisor quality
stays constant (Gino & Moore, 2007). As noted earlier, when an advisor is roughly as
knowledgeable as the judge, the optimal strategy is to adapt a weighting policy of .50.
However, people tend to overvalue their own opinion when the decision task is relatively
simple, and overvalue the opinion of their advisor when a decision task is relatively
difficult, even if the advisor is equally qualified to give advice on both the difficult and
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the simple tasks (Gino & Moore, 2007). Judges are also less likely to spend their own
time acquiring information for a decision task when the task is difficult and they can
consult an advisor (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). Task difficulty therefore
moderates the relationship between an advisor‟s recommendation and the judge‟s final
estimate.
Judges also make assessments of their own expertise (Arkes, Christensen, Lai, &
Blumer, 1987; Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994). Arkes et al. (1987) were able to
experimentally manipulate the participants‟ perception of content-specific expertise.
Accordingly, participants that had their perceptions of expertise bolstered reported more
confidence answering a set of questions, whereas participants in the low-expertise
manipulation reported less confidence while answering the same set of questions (Arkes
et al, 1987; Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994). Judge confidence in their own estimate is a
significant predictor of advice use (Gino, 2008). If a judge does not believe his answer is
accurate, he will be more receptive to the recommendation of an advisor. Additionally,
there is a positive relationship between a judge‟s initial estimate error and weighting
policy, such that judges with inaccurate initial judgments are more likely to utilize an
advisor‟s opinion (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000).
There has been limited research on the role individual differences play on judgeadvisor relationships. One individual difference which is theoretically linked to advice
utilization is the agreeableness facet of the Five-Factor Model (FFM; Mount & Barrick,
1995). Agreeable individuals are generally described as friendly, supportive, and
altruistic people that are likely to follow the desires and wishes of others. A literature
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review did not turn up any peer-reviewed sources specifically linking agreeableness to
advice use. However, prior research has linked judge expressivity to advice utilization
(Feng & MacGeorge, 2006). Judges that are more expressive are more likely to use
advice. Expressivity is defined in part by emotionality and interdependence, and is
moderately correlated with agreeableness (Gross & John, 1995). Additionally,
agreeableness is positively related to consensus decision making and supportive
communication (Sager & Gastil, 2006), suggesting that highly agreeable decision makers
are more likely to incorporate the opinions of others. Moreover, Bonaccio‟s (2007)
dissertation found agreeableness to be a significant predictor of advice utilization.
Specifically, Bonaccio found an interaction between agreeableness and advisor expertise
on advice use, such that high-agreeableness individuals were more likely to incorporate
estimates from novice advisors into their final estimate. Generalized self-efficacy has a
positive relationship with performance as well (Bandura, 1982) although some studies
suggest that the relationship between self efficacy and performance is not positive in all
situations (e.g. Vancouver, Thompson, Tischner, & Putka, 2002).
Research findings are mixed on the link between decision confidence and
decision accuracy. Some studies suggest that there is a positive relationship between
confidence and decision accuracy. For example, confident eyewitnesses are generally
more accurate (Sauerland & Sporer, 2009). Confidence and performance both tend to
increase with experience (Harvey & Fischer, 1995). However, confidence is not always a
valid predictor of accuracy (Lichtenstein, Fischoff, & Phillips, 1982). In one study, some
judges were given estimates randomly generated from a pool of responses, whereas other
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judges were given the estimates from the pool of responses that were most similar to their
own (Yaniv, Choshen-Hillel, & Milyavsky, 2009). Even though judges were told how
their advice was generated, judges were more confident in their final estimates when told
they had received the estimates which were closest to their own opinions
(interdependent), even though this gives them little meaningful information. When given
randomly sampled (independent) estimates, their confidence decreased, even though this
new information lead to more accurate estimates (Yaniv et al, 2009). Independent
estimates are more useful for improving decision accuracy (Yaniv, 2004), but people
report more confidence in their final estimate after receiving advice which is similar to
their initial estimate (Yaniv et al, 2009).
Harvey, Harries, and Fischer (2000) found that people are better at assessing the
quality of an advisor‟s estimate than actually utilizing it. Judges were asked to forecast
monthly sales, and then given forecasts from four other advisors. After assessing the
accuracy of each advisor‟s forecast, the judge then had to incorporate the advice into a
final estimate. Individuals were better at estimating the quality of the advisor‟s advice
then they were at compiling all estimates into a final sales forecast. One possible
explanation for this is that integrating the advice puts a heavier load on the judge‟s
working memory. Even though participants were able to accurately assess the quality of
the advice, they may have experienced some difficulty holding all forecasts in working
memory while applying a weighting policy, and therefore used non-optimal weighting
strategies. This effect decreases when the advisors are distinguished more saliently,
perhaps easing the load on the judge‟s working memory (Harvey et al, 2000).
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Judges are more willing to pay a fee for good advice than poor advice, and are
able to make an accurate determination of advice quality in as little as three trials (Yaniv
& Kleinberger, 2000). There is also less egocentric discounting when the advisors are
knowledgeable experts (Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). Feng and MacGeorge found that
judges place more value on advice when the advisor is older, more experienced, more
educated, and wiser than themselves (2006). Judges also are more likely to listen to
advice from people with whom they already have a close relationship (Feng &
MacGeorge, 2006). Judges prefer advice from advisors that exhibit more confidence in
their answers and that have a better track record of success (Sniezek & Buckley, 1995).
Confidence may act as a signal of quality because both confidence and performance tend
to increase with experience (Harvey & Fischer, 1997).
Judges lend more weight to good advice than poor advice; Yaniv and Kleinberger
(2000) found WOA averages of .52 and .26, respectively for good advice and poor
advice. However, even when advice was good, it seems the participants were still not
using it as much as they should. In the good advice condition, the advisor was more
accurate than the judge‟s initial judgment in 97% of the cases, so the judge‟s optimal
WOA should have been much greater than .50.
Research has shown that people prefer expert advisors to novices (Sniezek &
Buckley, 1995). However, to my knowledge, only one research study has manipulated
advisor characteristics and „expertise‟ while holding the actual advice quality constant
(Harvey & Fischer, 1997).
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Paying for Advice
Another variable which influences egocentric discounting is the cost of advice.
Most advice studies have given participants advice for free (e.g., Harvey & Fischer,
1995; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). However, several studies have been
conducted where participants pay to receive advice. These studies have found that people
treat advice as more valuable and more accurate if they had to pay to receive it (Gino,
2008; Patt, et al. 2006; Sniezak, et al. 2004). Because the judge has paid for the advice,
he or she perceives it as valuable and thus takes it into greater account while making a
final estimate. This over-valuation of paid advice relative to free advice of the same
quality is known as the paid-advice effect. The paid-advice effect has far-reaching
implications because people generally prepay for advice long before they are able to
accurately assess its quality, and before they choose how to utilize the advice they have
been given (e.g. financial advisors, management consultants, marriage counselors).
People weigh paid advice more heavily than free advice even when they are
informed that the costly advice is of the same quality as the free advice (Gino, 2008).
Participants were twice given the option of receiving advice in a JAS scenario, estimating
U.S. historical dates. They were offered a block of free advice for one set of questions
and could give up a certain amount of their winnings for advice on the other block of
questions. The participants were told that advice in both blocks consisted of estimations
from randomly selected participants from the pilot study. This meant that advisors were,
on average, as equally qualified as participants for the judgment task. Moreover, because
advisors were randomly selected for each question, it was impossible for judges to form
an impression of advice quality across questions. Gino (2008) found that the mean WOA
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was higher when participants paid for advice than when they received it for free
(WOA=.72 and .46, respectively). Participants actually overweighted the advice of the
advisor when they had to pay for it, and slightly underweighted it when they received it
for free.
Sniezak, et al. (2004) also found that prepaying for advice makes participants
more likely to utilize the advice in their final decision. Moreover, because the egocentric
bias was reduced, the participants in the paid advice condition were actually more
accurate with their final estimates. Because receiving the advice had cost them
something, they were less likely to reject the advice in favor of their own estimation. A
follow-up study suggested that the relationship between advice prepayment and advice
use is mediated by perceptions of advisor credibility (Patt, et al. 2006). Judges trusted the
advisor more when they had prepaid for the advice, and therefore were more likely to
accept the advisor‟s judgments as accurate.
Since prepaying for advice increases the perceived credibility of an advisor, it is
important to examine why people are willing to pay for the advice. It is possible that
paying for advice may inappropriately increase advice use and judge confidence in an
advisor. Although the paid advice effect reduces the egocentric bias, decision-makers
may simply be swapping one decision error for another. There are many circumstances
when people are willing to pay for the opinion of others, even if there is a shortage of
empirical evidence that the advice is worthwhile. Professional investors charge high fees
for their services, even though the stock market is inherently unpredictable (Bogle, 1999).
Likewise, people purchase mutual fund recommendations from fund managers, even
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though the fund managers have an inherent conflict of interest in their recommendations
(Freeman & Brown, 2001). Businesses hire external consultants to solve management
problems, and individuals pay for therapists to solve personal problems, although neither
one appears to be all that helpful (Dawes, 1994; Micklethwait & Woolridge, 1996;
Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006).
Judges are more receptive to the opinions of an advisor (and therefore more
willing to pay for said opinions) when a task is complex versus a simple task, even if the
advisor is no more qualified than the judge (Gino & Moore, 2007). People are generally
more willing to pay for advice when they are less confident in their own responses
(Godek & Murray, 2008). Research has shown that people generally believe they are
above-average on tasks which most people are able to do (such as driving a car or
operating a computer mouse), but below average on more challenging tasks, such as
computer programming (Kruger, 1999). Gino and Moore found that people are overconfident in their decision accuracy on simple tasks and under-confident in their decision
accuracy on complex „judgment‟ tasks (Gino & Moore, 2007). Although some research
suggests the opposite is true for „choice‟ tasks (Lichtenstein & Fischoff, 1977), this could
be an artifact of the experimental design.
Decision specific knowledge is another important predictor of willingness to pay
for advice. When they are low on decision-specific knowledge, judges are more willing
to solicit opinions and additional information, even if it comes at a cost to themselves
(Godek & Murray, 2008). Decision makers that use rational processing approaches
generally are willing to pay more for advice than individuals that are making decisions
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based on affective and emotional intuitions, also known as experiential processing
(Godek & Murray, 2008). However, this relationship is moderated by decision specific
knowledge, such that rational processors are only willing to pay more for advice when
they perceive their own knowledge to be minimal. When the judge has a large amount of
decision specific knowledge, there is no significant difference between rational
processing and experiential processing. Judges that know the subject area are less willing
to pay for outside opinions, regardless of their cognitive processing strategy.
One possible explanation for the overuse of prepaid advice is that judges who pay
for such advice are incapable or unwilling to rely on their own estimate in a final
decision. However, it seems that the paid-advice effect is more than just an indicator of (a
lack of) self-confidence or an idiosyncrasy of individuals that are willing to pay for
advice. In Study 2 of Gino (2008), all participants were required to receive advice in both
the paid block of advice and the free block, eliminating any self-selection effects for
advice payment. The effect was just as robust even when they had no choice whether or
not they paid for the advice. This suggests that the impact advice cost has on advice use is
causal and psychological in nature, not just a signal of confidence. Secondly, participants
were asked to give 90% confidence intervals of their initial estimates. The range of the
confidence interval was a significant predictor of advice use such that judges were more
likely to utilize an advisor‟s judgment on questions where the judge reported a wide
confidence interval. In other words, when the judge was merely guessing the right
answer, she was eager to use the advice she received. However, the effect of advice cost
on advice use was significant even when controlling for judge confidence. Judges gave
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more weight to prepaid advice then they should have, given the confidence expressed in
their initial estimate (Gino, 2008). Paid advice was valued more than unpaid advice even
when the judge was confident in her answer.
Sunk Costs
The prevailing view in advice research is that the paid advice effect is an
extension of the sunk costs effect (Gino, 2008). Because paying for advice is an
investment decision that yields a future product (namely, purchasing advice for one or
more decision-making problems), it is important to discuss investment research and sunk
costs in some detail. Rational economic decisions should not include prior investments,
but only evaluate the relative costs and benefits of future behavior. However, people do
not generally behave rationally in their investment decisions. Individuals are more likely
to continue spending resources on a project if they have already invested significant time,
money or effort into the endeavor (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). This holds true even when
the project is futile. This maladaptive tendency to throw good money after bad is known
as the sunk costs effect.
Garland found a linear relationship between sunk costs on a research and
development (R & D) project and commitment to complete it (1990). Participants that
had already poured a sizable investment into a project chose to spend additional money to
complete it even after a rival company came out with technology that rendered the project
obsolete (Garland, 1990). Decision makers may try to justify their past expenses by
completing projects, even if the costs to complete the project outweigh the benefits
(Staw, 1981). This attempt at justification can be targeted towards others who might
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evaluate their performance (e.g. stakeholders, supervisors, coworkers, the general public).
Additionally, the prevalence of the sunk-cost effect in personal decisions (ranging from
auto repair to romantic relationships) suggests that these attempts at justification are selftargeted as well.
This irrational economic behavior may extend from an overgeneralization of the
“Don‟t waste” rule (Arkes & Ayton, 1999). Since people see themselves as
fundamentally rational beings that only expend resources to gain something, they may be
willing to expend a large amount of resources to complete an ongoing project that is
almost certainly doomed, rather than accept a loss with no return. Arkes (1996) asked
participants to respond to a vignette about an R & D company that is developing a new
tent polymer. When a rival company began marketing a far superior product, the
decision-maker had to choose between continuing the investment and abandoning the
sunk cost. The researcher found that people were more willing to abort the failing project
if they sold the leftover material to a roofer for $5000 then if they sold it as „scrap,‟ also
for $5000. Since people do not want to appear wasteful, and associate scrap with waste,
they chose to continue down an ill-advised investment path rather than cut their losses.
The sunk costs effect influences future economic investment based on prior
economic investment. It also influences future behavior based on prior economic
investment. Arkes and Blumer (1985, Experiment 2) experimentally manipulated the cost
of season tickets for the Ohio University Theater. Patrons who paid the full price for their
season tickets were more likely to attend performances, whereas patrons that received a
discount attended fewer events. Once a season pass had been purchased, all ticket-holders
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had an identical license to attend any and all plays hosted by the theater. Because the cost
of tickets was varied randomly across participants, one can assume that the costs and
benefits of attending a show would be roughly equal across groups. The only difference
was the amount of money each person had „sunk‟ into that license. Therefore, the size of
the prior investment played a significant role in determining whether patrons would
attend or not attend each show. Likewise, in a situation where a judge has prepaid for
advice, if he has already „sunk‟ money into that advice, the size of that investment may
play a role in the way he uses that advice in the future (Gino, 2008).
Likewise, individuals acted irrationally when given the following scenario:
Assume that you spent $100 on a ticket for a weekend ski trip to Michigan.
Several weeks later you buy a $50 ticket for a weekend ski trip to Wisconsin. You
think you will enjoy the Wisconsin ski trip more than the Michigan ski trip. As you
are putting your just-purchased Wisconsin ski trip ticket in your wallet you notice
that the Michigan ski trip and the Wisconsin ski trip are for the same weekend.
It’s too late to sell either ticket, and you cannot return either one. You must use
one ticket and not the other. Which ski trip will you go on? (Arkes & Blumer,
1985, p. 126).
Even though the scenario stated that the decision maker expected to enjoy the
Wisconsin ski trip more than the Michigan ski trip, over half the participants chose to
attend the more expensive Michigan vacation. Because they had already paid for both
trips, the cost of attending should no longer be a consideration in choosing which trip.
However, most participants chose the option that had cost more in the past but would be
less enjoyable in the future. Over generalizing the rule to avoid or minimize waste
erroneously leads the participants to make an illogical choice. In a judge-advisor
scenario, the judge may try to minimize waste by using advice more if she has paid for it.
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If the advice is free, it is reasonable to reject advice as being poor quality (or average
quality) without invoking an impression of waste, but if advice is costly, rejecting advice
is wasteful. Moreover, the strength of the „don‟t waste‟ rule increases as the cost of the
advice increases (Gino, 2008).
Although the sunk costs effect is the dominant explanation for the paid advice
effect, there are two complementary explanations which may supplement sunk costs
theory in explaining why paying for advice causes individuals to weight the advice more
heavily. Judges may use advice cost as a signal of advice quality and therefore adjust
their weighting policy accordingly. In the absence of other information, consumers will
assume that more expensive products are more valuable than inexpensive products
(Monroe, 1973). Although the correlation between price and quality varies across product
categories (Ordonez, 1998), the relationship is generally positive. Patt, et al. (2006) found
that judges that prepaid for advice considered their advisors to be a more credible source
of advice. Accordingly, judges may therefore associate advice cost with advice quality,
and therefore weigh paid advice more heavily.
Cognitive dissonance may also play a role in this perception of advisor credibility
(Festinger, 1957; Gino, 2008). People experience cognitive dissonance if they pay for
something but do not use it. Judges generally perceive themselves as someone who only
gives money for something which has value. Since judges generally believe themselves
to be rational and see themselves as one who would only pay for advice if it is valuable,
they may experience discomfort if they pay for advice but choose to ultimately reject the
advice. If they have paid for advice, they must either use the advice in order to
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demonstrate its value, or change their schema of themselves to recognize that they have
paid for something worthless. In order to relieve this dissonance, judges that have paid
for advice may change their weighting policy in order to treat the advice as valuable.
To my knowledge, Gino (Study 3: 2008) is the only study which has directly
examined the psychological mechanisms behind the paid advice effect. This study
experimentally manipulated sunk costs, such that participants either had to pay $1 or $2
for advice. Half the participants in the $1 condition ended up receiving the advice for
free, as did half the participants in the $2 condition. The study supported the sunk costs
effect as a mechanism for the paid advice effect. Gino (2008) did not find judge
perception of advice quality to be a significant predictor of advice use. However, she was
using a study design that explicitly told judges that the advice was of the same quality
regardless of how much one paid for the advice. This may have confounded her measure
of advice quality. Additionally, Gino (2008) did not find self-reported cognitive
dissonance to be significantly related to advice use. However, because cognitive
dissonance is a subconscious process, it is possible that the participants were not aware of
any cognitive dissonance, or would have experienced even more discomfort in reporting
this dissonance. If a judge has indeed changed their schema or weighting policy in order
to see the advice as valuable, he would be unlikely to still be experiencing cognitive
dissonance and thus would be unlikely to report it.
Hypotheses
Judges do not use advice optimally (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). However,
almost any decision strategy which incorporates more than one independent observation
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will yield more accurate answers, because averaging cancels out error (Larrick & Soll,
2006). Therefore, even though judges may use imperfect weighting policies, it can be
expected that participants will generally estimate more accurately after they have
received advice.
Hypothesis 1: Final estimates will be more accurate than initial estimates
Judges are able to make an evaluation of accuracy, even without feedback (Yaniv
& Kleinberger, 2000). Although self report is not always the most reliable indicator of
competency, it does correlate with objective measures of performance (Jonas & Fletcher,
2004). Regardless of the accuracy of their self-evaluations, judges that consider
themselves to be „experts‟ should be less likely to use advice, and judges that consider
themselves to be relatively ignorant of the subject will be more receptive to advice. This
has been examined at an item level before (e.g. Gino, 2008), but to my knowledge there
has been no empirical research on global competency ratings and advice use.
Hypothesis 2a: Self-ratings of U.S. History knowledge will be positively related to
accuracy.
Hypothesis 2b: Self-ratings of U.S. History knowledge will be negatively related to advice
use.
Agreeable individuals are more likely to seek consensus decisions and
compromise with others (Sager & Gastil, 2006). Accordingly, they will be more willing
to shift their own estimates to take into account the opinion of an advisor. Bonaccio
(2007) found agreeableness to predict advice utilization, but this has not yet been
replicated in the advice literature.
Hypothesis 3: Agreeableness will be positively related to advice use.
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Judges vary their WOA based on the perceived quality of the advice (Yaniv &
Kleinberger, 2000). Research has shown that people prefer expert advisors to novices,
and expert advice reduces egocentric discounting (Sniezek & Buckley). Judges prefer
advice from more experience, more educated, and wiser advisors (Feng & MacGeorge,
2006). However, no research has been done which manipulates advisor „expertise‟ while
holding the actual advice quality constant.
Hypothesis 4a: Participants will use ‘expert’ advice more than ‘novice’ advice, even
when holding advice quality constant.
Hypothesis 4b: Participants will perceive ‘expert’ advice as more valuable than ‘novice’
advice, even when holding advice quality constant.
Hypothesis 4c: Participants will report greater confidence in their final estimates when
they are receiving expert advice then when they are receiving novice advice.
Judges that pay an advisor will weight that advice more heavily than judges that
receive free advice (Gino 2008). The prevailing theory is that sunk costs explain this
increase in advice utilization. However, the cost of advice may also act as signal of the
advice quality (Monroe, 1973). If advice cost does indeed act as a signal of quality to the
judge, it is reasonable to expect that advice which has a price tag attached will have a
high WOA and be rated as more valuable. Moreover, this will be true even if the judge is
told he or she does not have to pay for the advice.
Hypothesis 5a: Judges that pay for advice will use it more than judges that receive advice
for free.
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Hypothesis 5b: There will be a significant difference in advice use between the ‘free’
condition and the ‘costly no payment’ condition, such that the ‘costly, no payment’
advice is used more than the ‘free’ advice. 3
Hypothesis 5c: Participants will report a higher perceived value for the ‘costly, no
payment’ condition than for the ‘free’ condition.
People generally overestimate their own competency, especially on simple tasks
(Gino & Moore, 2005). Participants that are very confident in their own responses are
unlikely to be swayed by an advisor‟s recommendation, and may only be looking for
confirmation of the decision they reached during their „hypothesis generation‟ phase
(Schrah, Sniezek, & Dalal, 2006). Likewise, participants that have little confidence in
their initial estimate can be expected to weigh the advisor‟s recommendation more
heavily (Gino, 2008).
Accordingly, participants that had their perceptions of expertise bolstered reported
more confidence answering a set of questions, whereas participants in the low-expertise
manipulation reported less confidence while answering the same set of questions (Arkes
et al, 1987; Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994). Judge confidence in their own estimate is a
significant predictor of advice use (Gino, 2008). If a judge does not believe his answer is
accurate, he will be more receptive to the recommendation of an advisor. Additionally,
there is a positive relationship between a judge‟s initial estimate error and weighting
policy, such that judges with inaccurate initial judgments are more likely to utilize an
advisor‟s opinion (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000).
3

In the ‘costly no payment’ condition, the participant is informed that the advice costs a certain amount,
but they do not have to pay for it. In the ‘free’ condition, the cost of the advice is not mentioned. See the
procedure section for a more complete explanation.
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Hypothesis 6a: Judge confidence in his/her initial estimate will be positively related to
accuracy.
Hypothesis 6b: Judge confidence in his/her initial estimate will be negatively related to
advice use.
Hypothesis 6c: There will be a stronger negative relationship between judge confidence
and advice use in the novice advisor condition than in the expert advisor condition.
Judges are generally more receptive to information which supports their position
rather than contradicting it, even if such information yields little new information (Yaniv
& Milyavsky, 2009). Judges who receive advice that is similar to their own estimate are
therefore more likely to regard their estimate (and the advice) as accurate.

Hypothesis 7: Judge confidence in his/her final estimate will be positively related to
consensus between the initial estimate and advice.
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS
Participants
Judges (N = 100) were undergraduate students from a mid-sized southeastern
university. Participants were mostly female (64%) and Caucasian (90%). Participants
were primarily freshmen (62%) or sophomores (24%), and had an average age of 18.80
(SD = .99).
The students participated to fulfill an undergraduate research credit requirement,
but were told that they could earn a monetary bonus based on the accuracy of their
estimates on a knowledge quiz. The topic was U.S. History, but participants were not told
this during recruitment to avoid sampling bias.
Measures
U.S. History knowledge was assessed via a five-item self report scale written by
the author for this study (e.g. “I consider myself something of a U.S. History buff‟; see
Appendix A). The reliability of this scale was excellent (α = .88). Agreeableness was
measured with a ten-item scale from the international personality item pool (e.g. “I am
interested in people”; see Appendix B). This scale yielded a strong reliability coefficient
for my sample (α = .82), which is consistent with the reliability of this scale in other
samples (Goldberg, 1992).
The U.S. History questions used for the decision-making section of this study
were selected from a pool of 30 items from an earlier advice study (Gino, 2008). These
questions were selected because the historical events are obscure enough that it would be
unusual for participants to know the exact date, but possible for them to make a

25

reasonable estimate. A pilot test (N = 11) was conducted to generate advice for the full
study, and to narrow the test to a 15-item subset (see Appendix C). Pilot test participants
received a $.50 bonus for each question they got right (out of 30). The 15 final items
were selected by the researcher for roughly homogeneous variance, as well as the more
subjective evaluation that decision makers would have a difficult time setting a precise
date for the event. This was desirable in order to make the quality of the advice less
readily apparent, particularly during the expert advisor condition, and thus make the
participant suspicious of the experimental manipulation.
Accuracy was measured as the absolute difference between the judge‟s estimate
and the correct answer. Judge confidence was measured by the range of a 90% credibility
interval around their estimated date. This credibility interval will be explained further in
the procedure section. Advice value was rated after each final estimate, and was
measured by a single question (“How valuable was this advice to you?”).
Procedure
Participants were run individually, and the experimental procedure was conducted
via pencil and paper tests. Prior to beginning the decision task, participants were asked to
fill out a questionnaire which included demographic questions as well as self-report
measures of U.S. History knowledge and agreeableness. After completing the
questionnaire, participants were informed that they would receive $0.50 every time they
were within ten years of the correct answer when estimating a U.S. Historical date.
Accordingly, the participants had a financial incentive for high performance, and it was
in their best interest to utilize the estimates given them to make accurate judgments.
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The experiment was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, participants
estimated the year of 15 U.S. historical events since 1600 (e.g. “In what year was the first
US satellite in orbit?”). They were informed that they could earn up to $15 based on their
performance. Specifically, they would receive a $.50 bonus every time they correctly
estimated the correct answer (+/- 10 years). Participants received this bonus at the
conclusion of the study, and were not given feedback on the accuracy of any particular
estimate.
After they had made their initial estimate, they were asked to provide lower and
upper bounds for a 90% credibility interval. It was explained to the participants that they
should select the lower and upper bounds so as to be 90% sure that the true answer fell
somewhere between these two values. The range of this credibility interval therefore
serves as a measure of item-level initial confidence.
In the 2nd phase of the experiment, participants were told that they would have the
opportunity to answer these questions a second time, but would have the advantage of
receiving advice beforehand. The participants were told that the advice consisted of
randomly selected answers from other undergraduate students. This is an acceptable way
of generating estimates in a manner that makes it difficult for the judge to predict the
quality of advice across items (Gino, 2008; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000).
Advisor characteristics were experimentally manipulated in terms of advisor
expertise and advice cost. Participants were assigned to conditions according to a random
number generator. Advisor expertise had two conditions. In the „expert advice‟ condition,
the participants were told that the advice was randomly selected from a pool of history
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majors currently enrolled in an upper-level U.S. History course at Clemson. In the
„novice advice‟ condition, the participants were told that the advice was randomly
selected from a pool of students that are “on average, about as qualified as you are.”
However, all advice was generated in the same way, and was held constant across all
novice and expert conditions.
The participants were also randomly selected to be in one of three advice cost
conditions. In the „free‟ condition, participants did not have to pay for the advice. In the
two „costly‟ conditions, judges were told; “The cost of this advice is $3. The
experimenter is going to toss a coin. If the result of the coin toss is TAILS then $3 will be
subtracted from your earnings. If the result of the coin toss is HEADS you will receive
the advice for free.” After the coin flip, participants were reminded, “Because the coin
flip was TAILS (HEADS), you (do not) have to pay $3 for this advice.”
After the coin flip (if applicable), judges were given a piece of paper with the
advisor‟s estimates for each question, and were also able to view their initial estimates
and 90% C.I. Advice was chosen by randomly selecting an estimate from one of the pilot
test participants for each question. Although the advice itself was randomly generated,
participants across all conditions received the same advisor estimate. The questions for
stage 2 were the same questions that had been on the first quiz, and were presented in the
same order. Participants then made a final estimate, and again picked lower and upper
bounds for a 90% C.I. for each question, as well as rating the value of the advice. The
participants were thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.
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Payment
Judges received payment according to the accuracy of their judgments. For each
response that was within 10 years of the true date, they received $.50. Students in the
paid advice condition were not actually charged $3 for their advice in order to maintain
payment equity across conditions. Participants on average earned $4.23 for participating
(SD=$1.53). All participants earned at least $1.50.
Coding
Past judgment studies have used the “weight of advice” (WOA) measure to assess
advice use. WOA = |final estimate – initial estimate|/|advice– initial estimate|. If a judge
changes his final estimate to the exact value of the advisor‟s estimate, WOA is equivalent
to one. If the participant completely discounts the advice and retains her initial estimate
for her final judgment, WOA for that decision would be zero. If a participant chooses the
midpoint between the advisor‟s estimate and his own estimate, WOA would be 0.5. It is
worth noting that choosing the midpoint between estimates is the optimal strategy if the
judge and advisor are equally qualified and well-informed on the decision. If the judge‟s
initial estimates are generally more accurate than the advisor, optimal weight of advice is
somewhere between 0 and 0.50. If the advisor is more accurate than the judge, the
optimal WOA lies between 0.50 and 1.0. This averaging strategy tends to produce more
accurate answers because it cancels out error (Larrick & Soll, 2006).
Accuracy was defined as the absolute difference between the judge‟s estimate and
the true date, such that smaller values denote more accurate answers (Accuracy =
|Estimated Year – Correct Year|). Confidence was operationalized as the range between
upper and lower bounds on the 90% C.I. With both accuracy and confidence, lower
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values signify a more accurate/more confident response. „Consensus‟ was operationalized
as the absolute difference between initial estimates and the advisor‟s estimate for each
question.
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS
Data Screening
A between subjects ANOVA power analysis was conducted to determine the
sample size require to attain power of .80, presuming a medium effect size (r = .25). Prior
research has found a medium to strong effect size for advice cost, so this is expected to be
a conservative estimate of power. Results indicated that a balanced ANOVA with a
sample size of 93 would be sufficient for all main effects (no between subjects
interactions were specified). Due to random assignment issues, we ended up recruiting
100 participants. Frequency data for experimental condition can be found in Table 1.
All data were screened for univariate outliers. All typographical errors were
checked against the original data collection packet and corrected. Outliers that were +/- 3
standard deviations from the mean were identified. No outliers were identified for any of
the scales, and less than 2% of the estimates and confidence intervals were considered
outliers (See Table 3). Analyses were run both including and excluding these outliers, but
all results reported in this paper are with all data included unless otherwise noted. One
participant did not follow directions for the estimates and confidence intervals, and was
excluded from the analyses. Three participants did not indicate their gender, and a
tracking error caused us to lose advice cost information on four of the participants.
It was necessary to correct for some irrational weight of advice (WOA)
estimates.4 This occurred in about 8% of the cases for this sample. All analyses were
4

If a judge‟s final estimate does not fall between the advisor‟s estimate and their initial estimate, it is
possible for WOA to be calculated as a value greater than one. Using this value would not be a rational
interpretation of the data, as it is not sensible to consider the judge to exhibit a shift towards an advisor‟s
opinion in excess of 100%.
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therefore run twice. In the first set, all estimates with WOA > 1 were reset to 1, and in the
second set of analyses, estimates with WOA > 1 were deleted. Although there were some
slight differences in the strength of correlations, significance and directions of
relationships did not change for any of the hypotheses.
Descriptive statistics for all continuous variables are listed in Table 2 and a
correlation matrix can be found in Table 3. All results presented are with outliers
included. In order to be consistent with prior research, all results reported here are with
high WOA estimate set to a value of one.
Tests of hypotheses
To begin, it is important to establish that receiving advice actually improved
decision accuracy, regardless of decision strategy. Hypothesis 1 predicted that final
estimates would be more accurate than initial estimates. This hypothesis was fully
supported. The participants made final estimates with substantially lower mean absolute
error than their initial estimates (t = 7.04, p < .05; mean error of 25.43 years vs. 39.22
years).
Both parts of Hypothesis 2 were supported. Self Reported US History Knowledge
is a significant predictor of error in a judge‟s initial estimate (EIE; r = -.40). Furthermore,
US History Knowledge is significantly related to weight of advice (WOA; r = -.41).
Agreeableness was not significantly related to WOA (r = -.10), which means that
Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Next, I tested whether advisor characteristics influenced advice use. As mentioned
in my hypotheses, both advisor expertise (H4a) and advice cost (H5a-b) were expected to
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predict advice use. I conducted a series of between-subject ANOVAs with average WOA
as the DV and advisor condition as the categorical IV. Since self-ratings of prior
knowledge were related to WOA (see hypothesis 2b), I included US History knowledge
as a covariate in all ANOVAs. The ANOVA results revealed that advisor „expertise‟ was
a significant predictor of advice use even after controlling for judge US History
knowledge, F(3, 95) = 10.43, p < .05. Expert advice was valued significantly more than
novice advice WOA (Table 4), supporting Hypothesis 4a.
Next, I ran an ANOVA using advice cost as the categorical predictor. Contrary to
Hypothesis 5(a-b), advice cost was not a significant predictor of advice use, (F(4, 90) =
0.55, ns). Pairwise analyses revealed no significant differences between any of the three
advice cost conditions when controlling for judge US History knowledge (Table 5). An
ANOVA was conducted with advice cost, advisor expertise, and US History knowledge
all included as predictors, as well as an advice cost by advisor expertise interaction Only
advisor expertise (F(12, 82) = 10.92, p < .05) and US History knowledge (F(12, 82) =
12.63, p < .05) emerged as significant predictors (Table 6). A final model was run
including all possible two- and three-way interactions, but did not yield any significant
results (Table 7). Cell means for all conditions are presented in Table 8.
The above procedures were repeated again with judge ratings of advice „value‟ as
the DV instead of advice use. Because prior US History knowledge was a significant
predictor of „value‟ ratings, this was controlled for in all analyses. Advisor expertise
approached but did not reach significance as a predictor of value ratings (F(3, 95) = 3.29,
p = .07). Overall, participants in the expert advisor condition provided slightly higher
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value ratings than did participants in the novice advisor condition (Table 9). Advice cost
also approached significance (F(4, 94) = 2.67, p = .07). However, this relationship was in
the opposite direction from the prediction in Hypothesis 5c (Table 10). Pairwise
comparisons indicated a significant difference between free and paid advice, such that
free advice was valued somewhat more highly than paid advice (Table 11). There was no
interaction between cost and expertise (Table 12, Table 13).
Hypothesis 4c proposed that judges that received expert advice would be more
confident in their final estimates. However, most variation for confidence in final
estimate (CFE) was accounted for by a participant‟s confidence in his or her initial
estimate (CIE) (F(1, 97) = 75.59, p < .05). Advisor condition failed to explain a
statistically significant amount of additional variance, F(4, 94)= 1.65, p=.79, meaning
that Hypothesis 4c was not supported (Table 14).
Multilevel Analyses
The design of this research study allowed us to capture multiple observations for
each participant. Each judge gave 15 initial estimates, and gave 15 more estimates after
being provided with advice. The data collection method has given us information on the
error of the initial estimate, confidence in the initial estimate, error in the final estimate,
confidence in the final estimate, weight of advice, and self-ratings of advice value for
each question. This within-subjects design can result in analyses with more statistical
power.
However, regression analyses require an assumption of independence. Because
these measurement occasions are nested within persons, it is necessary to test this
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assumption of independence. The Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) is a measure of
non-independence. A high ICC indicates that a higher proportion of variance is explained
by differences in the average level of each person, also known as intercept variance. ICCs
were calculated for all dependent variables in H6a-c and H7 (see table 15). Although the
error explained by intercept variance was relatively small for most DVs, even relatively
small ICCs can cause researchers to overestimate effect sizes. The researcher therefore
used multilevel modeling for within-person analyses.
The first set of analyses tests the hypothesis that judge confidence in his or her
initial estimate would be a significant predictor of estimate accuracy. A multilevel
intercept-only model was run with initial estimate accuracy as the dependent variable. No
predictors were included in order to ascertain a baseline amount of error. Next, because
the difficulty of the question (as well as quality of the advice) varied across the 15 items,
trial was included as a predictor. Trial contributed a 16% improvement over the null
model (F(15, 1564) = 26.43, p <. 05). Next, initial estimate confidence was included as a
level 1 predictor, which means that it was allowed to vary randomly both within and
across individuals. A significant result would demonstrate that judges are able to
accurately judge the quality of their own estimates. When initial estimate confidence and
trial were included as predictors, the model jumped to a 31% improvement over the null
model, with confidence in initial estimate emerging as a statistically significant predictor
(F(16, 1462) = 23.25, p < .05).
A second analysis was run via the same procedure to determine if confidence in
one‟s initial estimate was a valid predictor of final estimate accuracy as well. Trial
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reduced error 42% relative to the intercept-only model (F(15, 1469) = 80.56, p < .05).
Confidence in initial estimate (CIE) was then included as a level 1 predictor. Judge
confidence in his or her initial estimate was not a significant predictor of final estimate
accuracy (F(16, 1465) = 1.43, ns). Therefore, Hypothesis 6a was supported for initial
estimate accuracy, but not supported for final estimate accuracy.
A similar procedure was run to test hypothesis 6b. Hypothesis 6b predicted that a
significant portion of variation in advice use (WOA) would be explained by judge
confidence in his or her initial estimate (CIE). An intercept-only model was tested with
WOA as the DV to determine the variance in the null model. Including trial as a predictor
reduced this variance by about 6% (F(15, 1418) = 6.99, p < .05). Adding judge
confidence as an additional level 1 predictor further reduced error, with an error reduction
for the full model of about 9% (F(16, 1416) = 54.43, p < .05). These results support
hypothesis 6b, suggesting that people are less interested in using an advisor‟s opinion if
they are confident in their own response.5
Hypothesis 6c predicted that there would be an interaction between a level 1
predictor (judge confidence in initial estimate) and a level 2 predictor (advisor expertise).
In order to test this hypothesis, I added advisor expertise to the above model, and
specified an expertise by confidence interaction term. Although a main effect for advisor

5

Note that although the slope between CIE and WOA is positive, CIE is calculated as the range of a 90%
confidence interval, so larger numbers actually indicates lower confidence. These findings are therefore in
the hypothesized direction, indicating that judges are less likely to use advice if they have designated a
narrow range of likely values.
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expertise was found (F(18, 1399) = 14.50, p < .05), the interaction was not significant
(F(18, 1399) = .004, ns). Therefore, hypothesis 6c was not supported.
Hypothesis 7 proposes that judges are more confident when there is relatively
little discrepancy between their initial estimate and the advice they receive. In the final
multilevel model analysis, we tested the effect of judge-advisor consensus on judge
confidence in his or her final estimate (CFE). This hypothesis was supported (F(16,
1461) = 72.65, p < .05), consensus explaining 27% of the intercept variance in CFE. A
post-hoc analysis was also conducted to determine if discrepancy was a significant
predictor of advice use. There is a positive relationship between discrepancy and WOA,
such that judges were more likely to use advice when it was further from their initial
estimate, F(1, 1431)=84.05, p<.05, r=.24.
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION
This section will begin by summarizing and discussing how both judge and
advisor characteristics may impact the use of advice within a decision making setting.
With that information providing a foundation, I will then discuss the primary
contributions of the current research. A discussion of limitations and future research
directions will close out this section of the paper.
Judge characteristics
The current results suggest that individuals have a reasonably accurate
understanding of their knowledge of a particular topic, in this case US History (H2a).
Furthermore, this assessment of their own knowledge influences the extent to which they
use their initial estimates when making a final decision (H2b). This is consistent with
prior research findings, which have found that judges compare their own qualifications to
that of their advisor (e.g. Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Sniezek et al., 2004; Yaniv &
Kleinberger, 2000). Yaniv and colleagues (e.g. Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000)
have suggested that egocentric bias comes from an inaccurate assessment of one‟s own
qualifications relative to an advisor‟s qualifications. However, even though US History
Knowledge predicted advice use, WOA averaged greater than .50 for all conditions,
which suggests that egocentric bias was greatly reduced or eliminated in this setting.
Possible explanations for this are discussed later in this section.
This study failed to find a relationship between agreeableness and advice
utilization (H3). Bonaccio (2007) did find a link between agreeableness and advice use,
so this non-significant result should be interpreted with caution. Specifically, the
rationale for the agreeableness-advice use link was that highly agreeable people would be
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more likely to engage in consensus decision making which would allow everyone to
share in final decisions. Bonaccio found that highly agreeable individuals were more
likely to incorporate the advice of novice advisors into their final estimate. Agreeableness
primarily influenced advice use by reducing the tendency of individuals to completely
discount less useful advice. Because people tended to overweight advice in my study, it
may be that any link between agreeableness and advice use was masked by a floor effect.
Moreover, it appears that judges re-evaluated the quality of their own estimate for
each question. Judge confidence in his or her initial estimate was a significant predictor
of advice use, even when their global estimate of US History Knowledge was included in
the model (H6b). This suggests judges make an assessment of their own competence for
specific decision tasks as well as subject domains, and that this in turn influences how
much people use advice. This finding slightly extends prior research suggesting that
advisor estimates of confidence influences advice use.
Advisor Characteristics
Advice use was also influenced by attributes of the advisor. Throughout this
study, the actual advice remained constant across all conditions, but advisor expertise and
advice cost were manipulated across subjects. Half of the participants were told that the
advice they were receiving was randomly sampled from students in a US History class,
while the other half were told that the advice was randomly sampled from the
undergraduate student body. I hypothesized that students in the expert advice condition
would be more willing to give expert advisors the benefit of the doubt when the judge‟s
initial estimate and the advisor‟s estimate were discrepant (H4a). Even though the expert
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sample was not any better informed than either the judges or the advisors in the novice
condition, judges did indeed use expert advice more than novice advice. Because this was
significant independent of actual advice quality, it suggests that people use advisor
characteristics when they are unable to make an accurate assessment of the advice
quality. It is worth noting that both novice and expert advice were weighted more heavily
than the judge‟s own estimate. Prior research has found that people are more likely to use
advice that comes from an expert (e.g. Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004). Moreover, as in
our study, this has held true even when advisor „expertise‟ is simply a label and the
advice itself does not vary in accuracy across conditions (Harvey & Fischer, 1997).
Moreover, judges also rated expert advice as being somewhat more valuable than novice
advice (H4b); although this finding was not significant, the results were in the expected
direction and approached significance (p = .07). However, judges were neither more nor
less confident in their final estimate after receiving „expert‟ advice.
Prior research found that judges weighed advice more heavily when they had to
pay for it (e.g. Gino, 2008; Patt, et al., 2006; Sniezek, et al., 2004). Surprisingly, advice
cost did not influence advice use on our study. One possible explanation for this is that
participants were assigned to advice conditions, and were not allowed to choose or reject
advice. However, Gino (2008) found that advice cost influenced advice use even when
judges were required to receive the advice. In her study, judges were receiving advice
from novices that were just as qualified as themselves, yet still chose to use the advisor‟s
opinion substantially more than their own when they had to pay for advice, thus
exhibiting that sunk costs may be playing a role in advice use. My research design was
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built to compare sunk costs theory to other competing hypotheses for the paid advice
effect. In my study, however, there was actually a slight (nonsignificant) trend to weigh
advice more heavily when cost was not mentioned at all. These findings are puzzling and
require follow-up research to understand what could have caused these results.
The interaction between advice cost and advisor expertise failed to reach
statistical significance. Sniezek et al. (2004) found a significant interaction between prepaying for advice and expertise. In their study, judges and advisors were live dyads (not
paper persons), and expert advisors had real training in the subject matter and therefore
more accurate estimates than novice advisors, and advice payment was a function of
payment timing (paying pre-advice or post-advice). Judges were more likely to use expert
advice if they had already paid for it, but not more likely to use novice advice that they
had already purchased.
Significant Contributions
The purpose of this study was to examine how judge and advisor characteristics
influence advice use. Specifically, judges vary their policy for integrating estimates
according to the perceived quality of the information. This research project advanced
advice research in several ways. This study tested several hypotheses that have only
recently been proposed and have not been evaluated by more than one or two researchers.
For example, I measured and controlled for judge characteristics which could influence
advice use, such as task specific knowledge, agreeableness and item-level confidence.
This study parsed advisor characteristics from the quality of the advice itself. To
my knowledge, there has only been one published research article that experimentally
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manipulated advisor expertise while holding advice quality constant (Harvey & Fischer,
1997). People who claim to be experts are often giving advice, even if there is little
evidence that their advice is any better than a layperson‟s (e.g. stockbrokers), or even that
they are true experts (e.g. infomercials).
Only a handful of studies have looked at the paid-advice effect at all (Gino, 2008;
Patt et al., 2006; Sniezek et al., 2004). This research adds to the body of empirical studies
in this domain, and raises questions about the generalizability of some of the findings. It
appears that the paid-advice effect may not be a factor across all circumstances. Gino
(2008) made a strong case that sunk costs sufficiently explain the paid advice effect. In
Gino‟s study, the sunk costs were experimentally manipulated, while other theories were
tested by a self-report scale. Accordingly, my study experimentally manipulated price as
a signal of advice quality as well as sunk costs. I added a second control group to test a
competing hypothesis, namely that price operates as a signal of advice quality. Although
the results were nonsignificant, it could have revealed an important distinction between
receiving „expensive‟ advice for free, and receiving free advice with no price tag attached
to it.
Additional studies may shed more light on this domain. For example, there are
still many questions regarding advice payment. Prior research has found that payment
timing can moderate the relationship between advice cost and advice use (Patt, et al.,
2006). I have already launched a follow up study which mimics the design of the current
study but changes the delivery of the advice and salience of the advice cost. Participants
receive a show up fee in an envelope before beginning the study, and any advice costs are
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taken out of this envelope. Moreover, they are not given the advice packet until it has
already been determined if they will need to pay for the advice. If this study were to find
results in the predicted direction, we may conclude that the order which judges pay for
and receive advice is an important factor indeed.
Limitations
The experimental design of this research design allowed for a great deal of
control. In particular, advisor characteristics were held constant across participants within
each condition. This boosted the internal validity of the study, but an experimental design
like this has relatively low external validity. Furthermore, there was only a relatively
small monetary incentive at stake for the decision task. It is important to replicate these
findings outside of the laboratory, and demonstrate that these tendencies generalize to
important decision tasks as well as trivial ones.
Another limitation of this study is that judges were unable to form a relationship
with the advisor across time. Advisor trust and reputation formation in the real world is a
longitudinal process, although judges can make an assessment of advice quality relatively
quickly (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). The research study was relatively informationimpoverished, allowing judges to only focus on the characteristics of interest to this
study. As mentioned earlier, all participants answered the same questions and received
the same advice, regardless of condition. It is possible that it would be more informative
to vary task characteristics such as task difficulty as well as advice quality characteristics.
There are several limitations of this study which may explain why advice cost was
not a significant predictor of advice use. It is possible that sunk costs didn‟t take hold
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because participants did not receive a show-up fee, and thus had not received any funds at
the point that they had money deducted. In fact, multiple participants expressed concern
that they didn‟t even earn enough money to pay for the advice. Another limitation of this
study is that participants did not choose whether or not they wanted to receive the advice.
Prior research (Gino, 2008; Study 2) found that the paid advice effect was robust enough
to operate even without judges choosing to receive advice. However, it is possible that
this does not generalize across all situations. In addition to this, participants were
randomly assigned to the paid advice and costly no payment conditions via a coin flip.
Some participants may have resented the fee for this unsolicited advice. The combination
of these two manipulations may have detached the payment from the advice itself. One
could even speculate that the research procedure may have led judges to feel like they
had relatively little control over their environment. Future research is envisioned in which
the parameters that influence the paid advice effect are explored more fully.
Future Research Directions
It would be interesting to explore research on other individual differences that can
influence judge-advisor perceptions. Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000) found that
participants are sensitive to manipulations in advice quality, but the advice itself is just
one cue that can signal advice quality. More broadly, this could be tied to Brunswick‟s
lens model, where judges form impressions of various cues that could predict advice
quality. Feng and MacGeorge (2006) identified a host of advisor characteristics that may
influence advisor trust and advice use. It may be fruitful to conduct further experimental
studies which manipulate characteristics of the advice and the advisor.
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It is important to explore individual differences in judges which may influence the
advice process. Although we did not find agreeableness to be a significant predictor of
advice use, there may be other traits which make people more or less willing to seek and
use advice. This environment was a relatively weak situational cue for interpersonal
behavior, since we were using papers persons. Furthermore, it may be feasible to
experimentally manipulate judge characteristics, such as perceptions of his or her
competency. Recent performance may outweigh the sobriety of a long-term outlook, and
learning and memory biases may prevent persons from having an accurate view of their
own ability. If judges make inaccurately optimistic or gloomy predictions of their task
efficacy, this will probably influence both advice seeking behavior and advice use.
One research area that we did not explore was the influence of situational
characteristics on advice use. Task difficulty has been shown to have a profound impact
on WOA (Gino & Moore, 2007). People generally expect themselves to do better than
average on very easy tasks, and worse than average on very difficult tasks. The task that
we had participants perform was relatively difficult, which may explain why the judges
weighted the advice so heavily. However, there are many task dimensions that have not
yet been explored in detail, such as the nature of the task, task length and task
complexity.
Relatively little advice research has explored interactions across multiple sources.
For example, there are only a few studies which have manipulated judge expertise and
advisor expertise simultaneously (e.g. Harvey & Fischer, 1997). Prior research has shown
that advice cost can influence advice use even if advisors do not get to choose whether or
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not they receive the advice (Gino, 2008), yet this may not be true in all situations.
Moreover, it may be profitable to examine how individuals integrate advice (e.g. Schrah,
2006). Advice literature may benefit from a more harmonious integration with multiple
cue probability learning (MCPL) research, since judges often use information acquired
both from other decision makers and from more passive sources.
Finally, advice cost research has focused on purchasing advice in blocks, before
seeing the details of the specific advice task (e.g. Gino, 2008). However, in many
situations, judges are able to form their own evaluation before deciding whether or not to
pay for help. For example, a homeowner may evaluate his own problem-solving
capabilities before paying for an electrician, or a citizen may attempt to complete his own
taxes before calling a tax professional. This current research study showed that judge
confidence predicted advice use both at the person level and at the decision item level. If
an individual was confident in his or her initial estimate, he was much less likely to use
advice. It may be profitable to conduct a study that allows participants to purchase advice
on a per-question basis to see whether initial confidence will influence a judge‟s
willingness to pay for advice.
Conclusion
This research study makes an important contribution to the advice literature by
demonstrating a link between judge confidence and advice use at multiple levels of
measurement. Furthermore, advisor expertise was found to be a significant predictor of
advice use even when advisor quality did not vary across advisor conditions. While it is
surprising that the advice cost manipulation was inconclusive, this nonsignificant finding
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raises important questions about the situational specificity of the paid advice effect.
Future research should seek to uncover important task, judge, and advisor characteristics
which may moderate this relationship.

47

APPENDICIES
Appendix A: Decision-specific (U.S. History) Knowledge
1. I consider myself something of a U.S. History buff
2. I know a lot about U.S. History
3. I‟ve been exposed to a lot of information on U.S. History.
4. I‟m more informed about U.S. History than the average person
5. I‟ve learned a good bit of U.S. History
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Appendix B: Agreeableness Scale
Agreeableness (IPIP Big Five, Alpha=.82)
1. I am interested in people
2. I sympathize with others' feelings
3. I have a soft heart
4. I take time out for others.
5. I feel others' emotions
6. I make people feel at ease.
7. I am not really interested in others
8. I insult people
9. I am not interested in other people's problems
10. I feel little concern for others
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Appendix C: US History Questions for Pilot Test
(Gino, 2008)
1. When did the Congress declare war on Mexico?
2. In what year did Vietnam fall to Communists?
3. In what year was the Korean armistice signed?
4. In what year was NATO formed?
5. In what year was the Cuban missile crisis?
6. In what year did the Pilgrims reach Cape Cod?
7. When was the Truman Doctrine announced?
8. When was the Berlin wall built?
9. In what year was OPA (Office of Price Administration) established?
10. In what year was the first transcontinental railroad completed?
11. In what year the Women‟s rights convention at Seneca Falls take place?
12. In what year was the Presidential Succession Act?
13. When did Texas declare its independence (Battle of the Alamo)?
14. In what year was the National Labor Union formed?
15. In what year was the first US satellite in orbit?
16. When was the Standard Oil Trust organized?
17. In what year was the Civil Rights Act?
18. In what year was the Voting Rights Act?
19. When did the first American astronaut orbit earth?
20. In what year was SEC (Securities Exchange Commission) created?
21. When was the Emancipation Proclamation?
22. When was the Panama Canal opened to shipping?
23. In what year was Louisiana purchased?
24. When was the Haymarket Riot?
25. When did Mussolini seize power in Italy?
26. When was the Massachusetts Bay Colony founded?
27. When did the Korean War start?
28. In what year were US troops sent to South Vietnam?
29. When was the American Constitution first drafted?
30. When was the Bill of Rights ratified?
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Appendix D: US History Questions used in full study
1. In what year was the first transcontinental railroad completed?
2. In what year was the first US satellite in orbit?
3. In what year was NATO formed?
4. When was the Massachusetts Bay Colony founded?
5. When was the Berlin wall built?
6. In what year was OPA (Office of Price Administration) established?
7. When did Texas declare its independence (Battle of the Alamo)?
8. When did Mussolini seize power in Italy?
9. When was the Truman Doctrine announced?
10. When did the first American astronaut orbit earth?
11. In what year was SEC (Securities Exchange Commission) created?
12. When was the Panama Canal opened to shipping?
13. In what year was Louisiana purchased?
14. When was the Haymarket Riot?
15. In what year was the Korean armistice signed?
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Table 1
Between-Subjects distribution table
Cost/Expertise
Free
CNP*
Paid
Total
Novice
14
16
17
47
Expert
16
16
15
47
Total
30
32
32
94
*Costly No Payment condition. Participants were told they might have to pay for advice but a
coin flip determined that they would not actually have to pay for the advice.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name
Age
Gender
Class
Agreeableness
US History Knowledge
Error in Initial Estimate (EIE)
Error in Final Estimate (EFE)
Confidence in Initial Estimate
(CIE)
Confidence in Final Estimate
(CFE)
Weight of Advice (WOA)
Advice Value

N
100
97
100
100
100
99
99
99

Mean
18.88
.64
1.59
5.77
3.20
39.22
25.43
51.52

Std. Deviation
.99
.48
.90
.69
1.31
20.39
4.41
43.32

99

40.34

17.26

99
99

.67
4.76

.19
1.01
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

1. Age

-

2. Class

.88*

-

3. Gender

.05

.08

-

4.Agreeableness

.10

.08

.31*

.82

5. U.S. History

.01

.07

-.21*

.00

.88

6. Avg. Value

.00

.00

.07

.04

-.30*

.86

7. Avg. EIE

-.09

-.08

.18

.09

-.40*

.10

.65

8. Avg. EFE

-.15

-.13

.04

.15

-.12

.15

.31*

.03

9. Avg. CIE

.14

.16

-.06

-.11

-.30*

.14

.54*

.10

.84

10. Avg. CFE

.10

.14

.06

-.20*

-.28*

.26* .25*

.06

.66*

11. Avg. WOA

.03

-.01

.01

-.10

.41*

.50* .43* .26* .31* .23* .82

.83

*p<.05
**EIE = Error in Initial Estimate, EFE = Error in Final Estimate, CIE = Confidence range in
Initial Estimate, CFE = Confidence range in Final Estimate, WOA = Weight of Advice, Avg.
Value = judge ratings of advice value for each advisor estimate
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Table 4:
ANOVA Table for Advisor Expertise, controlling for US History Knowledge

Corrected Model
Intercept
US History
Expertise
Error
Total
Corrected Total

SS
.881
43.871
.692
.282
2.566
47.425
3.446

df
2
1
1
1
95
98
97

MS
.440
43.871
.692
.282
.027

DV= Weight of Advice
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F value
16.31
1624.42
25.64
10.43

Sig.
.000
.000
.000
.002

r

r-square
.51
.26
.44
.28

.20
.08

Table 5:
ANOVA Table for Advice Cost, controlling for US History Knowledge

Corrected Model
Intercept
US History
Advice Cost
Error
Total
Corrected Total

SS
.504
42.144
.451
.033
2.694
45.624
3.198

df
3
1
1
2
90
94
93

MS
.168
42.144
.451
.016
.030

DV= Weight of Advice
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F value
5.61
1407.82
15.07
.55

Sig.
.001
.000
.000
.581

R
r-square
.40
.16
.38
.10

.14
.01

Table 6:
Full WOA model (all 2- and 3-way interactions included)

Corrected Model
Intercept
Advice Cost
Expertise
US History
Cost*Expertise
Error
Total
Corrected Total

SS
df
.810
6
42.267
1
.026
2
.286
1
.475 1
.017
2
2.388
87
45.624
94
3.198
93

MS
.135
42.267
.013
.286
.475
.008
.027
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F value
4.92
1539.92
.48
10.44
17.32
.30

Sig.
.000
.000
.620
.002
.000
.740

R
r-square
.50
.25
.09
.30
0.39
.07

.01
.09
.15
.01

Table 7: WOA values for Advice Cost and Advisor Expertise
SS
Corrected Model
Intercept
Expertise
Advice Cost
US History
Cost*Expertise
Cost*US History
Expertise*History
Expertise*Cost*History
Error
Total
Corrected Total

df

.883
6
40.492
1
.308
2
.019
1
.357 1
.013
2
.031
2
.019
1
.029
2
2.315
82
45.624
94
3.198
93

MS

F value

.08
40.492
.308
.010
.357
.006
.015
.019
.014
.028

2.84
1434.35
10.93
.34
12.63
.22
.54
.68
.51
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Sig.
.00
.00
.00
.71
.00
.80
.58
.41
.60

r
.53

rsquare
.28

.31
.08
.33
.07
.10
.08
.10

.10
.01
.11
.01
.01
.01
.01

Table 8
WOA cell means by condition

Novice Advisor
Expert Advisor
Total

Free Advice
0.65
0.74
0.70

CNP Advice
0.62
0.72
0.67
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Paid Advice
0.58
0.73
0.65

Total
0.62
0.72

Table 9:
ANOVA Table for Advisor Expertise, controlling for US History Knowledge

Corrected Model
Intercept
Expertise
US History
Error
Total
Corrected Total

SS
12.172
2227.42
2.99
10.34
86.459
2329.08
98.631

df
2
1
1
1
95
98
97

MS
6.086
2227.42
2.99
10.34
.91

DV=Advice Value
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F value
6.68
2447.47
3.29
11.36

Sig.
.002
.000
.073
.001

r

r-square
.35
.12
.17
.32

.03
.10

Table 10:
ANOVA Table for Advice Cost, controlling for US History Knowledge
SS
Corrected
Model
Intercept
US History
Advice Cost
Error
Total
Corrected Total

14.790
2141.462
9.427
4.961
82.695
2247.240
97.485

df

MS
3

4.930

F value

Sig.

5.366

.002

1 2141.462 2330.645
1
9.427
10.260
2
2.480
2.699
90
.919
94
93

.000
.002
.073

DV= Advice Value
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R
.39

rsquare
.15

.31
.23

.10
.05

Table 11:
ANOVA Table for Advice Cost and Value, controlling for US History Knowledge
Hypothesis 5a-b
Free Advice
CNP Advice
Paid Advice

Value
5.02
4.86
4.48

Std. Error
.176
.170
.169
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Table 12:
Advice Cost and Advisor Expertise, controlling for US History knowledge
SS
Corrected Model
Intercept
Expertise
Advice Cost
US History
Cost*Expertise
Error
Total
Corrected Total

17.774(a)
2139.720
2.249
4.819
10.206
.700
79.711
2247.240
97.485

df

MS

F value

6
2.962
3.233
1 2139.720 2335.386
1
2.249
2.455
2
2.409
2.630
1
10.206
11.139
2
.350
.382
87
.916
94
93

DV=Advice Value
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Sig.
.006
.000
.121
.078
.001
.684

R
.43

rsquare
.18

.15
.22
.32
.08

.02
.05
.10
.01

Table 13:
Value ratings by condition, controlling for US History knowledge

Novice Advisor
Expert Advisor

Free Advice
4.93
5.12

CNP Advice
4.58
5.14
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Paid Advice
4.39
4.58

Table 14:
CFE by expertise, controlling for CIE
SS
Corrected
12882.241(a)
Model
Intercept
28122.639
Expertise
12.466
Confidence in
12582.799
Initial Estimate
Error
16330.208
Total
188854.161
Corrected
29212.449
Total

df

MS

2

F value

Sig.

6441.121

37.471

.000

1 28122.639
1
12.466

163.602
.073

.000
.788

1 12582.799

73.200

.000

95
98

171.897

97

DV= Confidence in Final Estimate

65

R
.66

rsquare
.44

.00
.66

.00
.43

Table 15
Intraclass Correlation Coefficients
Variable
Weight of Advice (WOA)
Error in Initial Estimate (EIE)
Confidence in Initial Estimate (CIE)
Error in Final Estimate (EFE)
Confidence in Final Estimate (CFE)

ICC
.19
.08
.39
.08
.11
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